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Buying West Florida from the Indians:
the Forbes Purchase and Mitchel v. United States (1835)
Blake A. Watson*
In 1773 and 1775, a handful of individuals purchased lands, located in
present-day Illinois and Indiana, from the Illinois Confederacy and the
Piankeshaw Indians.
The United States Supreme Court, however,
disallowed the private sales in Johnson and Graham’s Lessee v. McIntosh
(1823).1 Chief Justice John Marshall announced in Johnson that the
European “discovery” of America automatically divested native Indians of
the “power to dispose of the soil at their own will, to whomsoever they
pleased.”2 Consequently, the Court denied “the power of Indians to give,
and of private individuals to receive, a title which can be sustained in the
Courts of this country.”3
Approximately thirty years later, two trading houses and an individual
acquired lands, located south and west of present-day Tallahassee, Florida,
from the Creek and Seminole Indians. After protracted litigation, the
“Forbes Purchase” was upheld by the Supreme Court in Mitchel v. United
States (1835).4 Justice Henry Baldwin stated that “the view taken by this
Court in the case of Johnson v. M’Intosh . . . has received universal
assent,”5 but nonetheless held that the grants at issue were “competent by
law to vest a title.”6
When Mitchel was argued, the Supreme Court was at a crossroads
regarding the meaning of the controversial “discovery” doctrine. According
to Johnson, Indians after discovery held “occupancy” rights that were
subject to the discoverer’s right of ownership and right of preemption.7
Marshall, however, reshaped his conception of aboriginal title in Worcester
* Professor of Law, University of Dayton School of Law; J.D. 1981, Duke University School of
Law; B.A. 1978, Vanderbilt University.
1 21 U.S. 543 (1823).
2 Id. at 574. See generally BLAKE A. WATSON, BUYING AMERICA FROM THE INDIANS: JOHNSON
V. MCINTOSH AND THE HISTORY OF NATIVE LAND RIGHTS (2012).
3 Johnson, 21 U.S. at 572.
4 34 U.S. 711 (1835).
5 Id. at 746.
6 Id. at 738. See also id. at 761 (“[W]e think the title of the petitioner is valid by all the rules
prescribed by the acts of congress, which give us jurisdiction of the case”).
7 Thomas Jefferson, in his role as Secretary of State in the Washington Administration, described
the right of preemption in Indian lands as “the sole and exclusive right of purchasing from them
whenever they should be willing to sell.” Thomas Jefferson, XVII THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS
JEFFERSON 328 (Andrew A. Lipscomb & Albert Ellery Bergh eds., 1904).
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v. Georgia (1832), declaring in dicta that discovery “gave the exclusive
right to purchase, but did not found that right on a denial of the right of the
possessor to sell.”8 In other words, Marshall attempted to turn away from
Johnson and return ownership of native lands to the Indians, albeit still
subject to the government’s right of preemption.9
Baldwin makes no mention of Worcester in Mitchel, but instead cites
Johnson with approval. In light of this fact, most Indian law scholars have
concluded that Mitchel affirmed the Johnson version of the discovery
doctrine.10 A few scholars, however, have argued that Mitchel actually
rejects the Johnson doctrine and instead endorses the views advanced by
Chief Justice Marshall in Worcester.11 As it turned out, Johnson v.
McIntosh is the leading American case defining—and limiting—native land
rights. Worcester v. Georgia is a prominent case in federal Indian law, but
for other reasons. Mitchel v. United States is not a prominent case in
federal Indian law, although the decision is an important part of Florida
history.
This article takes an in-depth look at Mitchel v. United States. In order
to place the Forbes Purchase in historical context, Part I provides an
overview of European and American control of Florida. Part II details the
events that led to the sale by the Creek and Seminole Indians of nearly a
million and a half acres in 1804-1806 and 1810-1811. Part III describes the
efforts of the purchasers and subsequent grantees to obtain confirmation of
the Forbes Purchase. Part IV details the decisions in the Mitchel litigation.
The purchase is compared in Part V to other transfers of Indian lands to
private individuals, including the sales by the Illinois and Piankeshaw
Indians of their homelands in 1773 and 1775. What distinguishes Mitchel
from Johnson is the fact that the Spanish government both approved and
confirmed the Forbes Purchase. Finally, I explain in Part VI why I disagree
with scholars who argue that Mitchel rejects the Johnson doctrine. Rather
than embrace Marshall’s views of the discovery doctrine set forth in
Worcester, the Supreme Court in Mitchel endorsed and applied the Johnson
discovery rule.
A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF FLORIDA HISTORY: 1513-1845
When Spanish explorer Juan Ponce de León came ashore in 1513,
there were an estimated 350,000 indigenous inhabitants in Florida,

8
9
10
11

31 U.S. 515, 544 (1832).
See WATSON, supra note 2, at 322-28.
See infra Part VI.
Id.
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including the Apalachee, Calusa, Tequesta, and Timucua Indians.12 Over
time, Spain established settlements at Pensacola and St. Augustine, and
asserted authority over the peninsula. However, after being defeated in the
Seven Years’ War, Spain was forced in February of 1763 to cede East and
West Florida to Great Britain.13 Eight months later, King George III issued
the Royal Proclamation of October 7, 1763, which barred the purchase of
native lands “without our especial leave and licence for that purpose first
obtained.”14 Great Britain’s possession of Florida, however, lasted just two
decades. In 1783, following the American Revolution, Spain regained
sovereignty over the colony by virtue of the second Treaty of Paris.15
The Spanish in 1784 closed New Orleans to American commerce, but
the United States was able to secure navigation rights on the Mississippi
River in Pinckney’s Treaty (the Treaty of San Lorenzo).16 The 1795 Treaty
also defined the boundaries of East and West Florida; however, the border
issue resurfaced in the first decade of the nineteenth century when the
United States aggressively asserted that part of West Florida was included
in the 1803 Louisiana Purchase.17 Thereafter, the Spanish hold on the
Florida panhandle grew increasingly tenuous, and in 1818 General Andrew
Jackson crossed the border, captured Pensacola, attacked native settlements,
and ultimately executed two British subjects suspected of aiding the
Seminole and Creek Indians.18 In the same year, the Spanish minister, Luis
de Onis, and Secretary of State John Quincy Adams, began negotiating the
transfer of Florida. The Adams-Onis Treaty was signed on February 22,
12
Glenn Boggs, Florida Land Titles and British, Not Just Spanish, Orgins, 81 FLA. B.J. 7, 23
(July/Aug. 2007); Glenn Boggs, Free Florida Land: Homesteading for Good Title, 83 FLA. B.J. 1, 11
(Jan. 2009).
13
The North American component of the Seven Years’ War is known as the French and Indian
War. The cession of Florida is set forth in the Treaty of Paris, signed on February 10, 1763. See
generally COLIN GORDON CALLOWAY, THE SCRATCH OF A PEN: 1763 AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF
NORTH AMERICA (2006). The boundary dividing East and West Florida was the Apalachicola River,
located between present-day Tallahassee and Panama City. See Mitchel v. United States, 34 U.S. 711,
738 (1835).
14 AMERICAN COLONIAL DOCUMENTS TO 1776, at 642 (Merrill Jensen ed., 1962).
15 Mitchel, 34 U.S. at 720-21; LAWRENCE KINNAIRD, THE SIGNIFICANCE OF WILLIAM AUGUSTUS
BOWLES’ SEIZURE OF PANTON’S APALACHEE STORE IN 1792, at 156 (Univ. Ga. Press, 1931).
16 David E. Wilkins, Johnson v. M’Intosh Revisited: Through the Eyes of Mitchel v. United
States, 19 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 159, 171-72 (1994).
17 WILLIAM S. COKER & THOMAS D. WATSON, INDIAN TRADERS OF THE SOUTHEASTERN
SPANISH BORDERLANDS: PANTON, LESLIE & COMPANY AND JOHN FORBES & COMPANY, 1783-1847,
263 (1986); see also WALTER W. MANLEY II, E. CANTER BROWN JR. & ERIC W. RISE, THE SUPREME
COURT OF FLORIDA AND ITS PREDECESSOR COURTS, 1821-1917, at 3 (1997) (“By the 1810s many
individuals residing to the north had begun to view the [Florida] colony as ripe for plucking . . . .”);
SIDNEY WALTER MARTIN, FLORIDA DURING THE TERRITORIAL DAYS 1-2 (1944) (“The occupation of
most of West Florida was a flagrant aggression on Spanish territory, but the Madison administration
insisted that it had actually been acquired by the purchase of Louisiana in 1803.”).
18
MARTIN, supra note 17, at 2. Jackson’s expedition is known as the First Seminole War.
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1819, but not finally proclaimed until February 22, 1821.19 On March 30,
1822, Congress passed “[a]n Act for the Establishment of a Territorial
Government in Florida,”20 authorizing a governor, a legislative council, and
two superior courts. After two decades of territorial government, and
following the conclusion of the Second Seminole War (1835-1842), Florida
became the twenty-seventh state on March 3, 1845.
THE FORBES PURCHASE (1804-1806 AND 1810-1811)
The story of the Forbes Purchase begins with Panton, Leslie and
Company, a trading house formed by five Scottish merchants who remained
loyal to Great Britain during the American Revolution.21 The merchants,
who “had long been established at St. Augustine,” persuaded the Spanish
monarch, Charles III, to grant them a license “to carry on and continue their
commercial operations in [the Florida] provinces and Louisiana.”22 The
Company established trading posts at several locations, including Pensacola
and St. Marks, near present-day Tallahassee.23 The partners extended credit
to their native customers, and the large debt owed by the Seminoles and the
Creek Nation was one reason why they agreed to sell tribal lands in 1804
and 1810.
The other reason for the Forbes Purchase was the request for
indemnification by Panton, Leslie and Company in response to robberies of
the St. Marks store in 1792 and 1800. On January 16, 1792, a party of
Indians, led by William Augustus Bowles, plundered the post as part of a
British-backed plan to break up the Company’s trading monopoly in the
region.24 On February 21, 1799, the Governor at New Orleans, Manuel
19

MANLEY, BROWN & RISE, supra note 17, at 4.
Act of Mar. 30, 1822, ch. 13, 3 Stat. 654-659 (1822). The two courts were placed in St.
Augustine and Pensacola. In 1824 a third superior court was located at Tallahassee and designated the
Middle District. Act of May 26, 1824, ch. 163, 4 Stat. 45-47 (1824).
21
JOSEPH M. WHITE, Argument in Defence of Indian Sales: Exposition, Historical and Legal, of
the Title of Colin Mitchell and Others to Lands in Florida, in A NEW COLLECTION OF LAWS, CHARTERS
AND LOCAL ORDINANCES OF THE GOVERNMENTS OF GREAT BRITAIN, FRANCE AND SPAIN, RELATING
TO THE CONCESSIONS OF LAND IN THEIR RESPECTIVE COLONIES 711-12 (1839). The original partners
were William Panton, John Leslie, Thomas Forbes, Charles McLatchy, and William Alexander. COKER
& WATSON, supra note 17, at 15. Alexander McGillivray, John Forbes, John Forrester, Robert Leslie,
William Simpson, James Innerarity, and John Innerarity also became partners in Panton, Leslie and
Company, or its successor, John Forbes and Company. Id. at 363-64.
22
Mitchel v. United States, 34 U.S. 711, 726 (1835). The partners agreed to swear an oath of
allegiance to Spain. Id.
23
The site chosen for the St. Marks store was on the west side of the Wakulla River, about four
miles above its confluence with the St. Marks River. Mark F. Boyd, Events at Prospect Bluff on the
Apalachicola River, 1808-1818, in 16 FLA. HIST. Q. 55, 56-57 (1937) (includes map).
24
With regard to estimates of the value of the merchandise taken, see 4 AMERICAN STATE
PAPERS: PUBLIC LANDS 161 (2,674 pounds, 1 shilling); COKER & WATSON, supra note 17, at 151 (at
least $10,000); id. at 154 (in excess of $15,000). According to William Panton, the robbery was
20
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Gayoso de Lemnos, informed William Panton that Spain had no objection
to the trading company’s plan to obtain a cession of Indian lands in the
United States as payment for debts owed and losses due to theft.25
Following a second robbery of the St. Marks store in May of 1800, the
representatives of Panton, Leslie and Company petitioned the King of Spain
directly for indemnification.26
William Panton died on February 26, 1801, and the name of the
trading house was later changed to John Forbes and Company.27 The
remaining partners continued to seek reimbursement, but now sought a
cession of Indian lands within Spanish Florida. In January of 1804, James
Innerarity informed the governor of West Florida, Vincente Folch, of
“offers made at a general meeting of the Indians in the month of June last,
by various chiefs of the Seminole tribe, to . . . cede . . . a portion of the
lands occupied by the said Indians . . . .”28 Governor Folch granted
committed by “a party of freebooting Indians, at whose head was the notorious William Augustus
Bowles, and a number of the chiefs of the villages of Cowetas, Broken Arrow, Hitchetas, Ufales,
Chichas, and inhabitants of the point named Ousutches . . . .” 4 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: PUBLIC
LANDS 161 (statement of William Panton to Don Vincente Folch y Juan, Governor of West Florida, at
Pensacola, on Jun. 2, 1799); see also JAMES F. DOSTER, THE CREEK INDIANS AND THEIR FLORIDA
LANDS, 1740-1823, at 245 (1974).William Bowles, who was born in Maryland in 1763, was a Loyalist
with two wives, a Cherokee and a daughter of a Creek chief. After the 1792 robbery of the St. Marks
trading post, Bowles was captured by the Spanish and sent to the Philippines. During a return trip to
Spain, he escaped and eventually returned to Florida. He declared himself the Director General of the
Muskogee Nation. In May of 1800, he once again plundered the store at St. Marks. At an Indian
council on May 24, 1803, Bowles was seized by his opponents and turned over to the Spanish
authorities. He died in a Havana prison in 1805. See generally J. LEITCH WRIGHT, JR., WILLIAM
AUGUSTUS BOWLES: DIRECTOR GENERAL OF THE CREEK NATION (1967). Bowles was backed by Lord
Dunmore, the Governor of the Bahamas who sided with Loyalist refugees opposed to Panton, Leslie and
Company. Kinnaird, supra note 15, at 158, 165-72; see also COKER & WATSON, supra note 17, at 115,
151. Dunmore, when he was the royal governor of Virginia prior to the American Revolution, was one
of the twenty individuals who purchased two large tracts of land in October 1775 from the Piankeshaw
Indians; see WATSON, supra note 2, at 77-99.
25
Mitchel, 34 U.S. at 727; DOSTER, supra note 24, at 245.
26
John Forbes and John Innerarity, in an affidavit dated August 25, 1802, stated that the May
1800 robbery was carried out by “a party of freebooting Indians, at whose head was the notorious
William Augustus Bowles, and a number of the chiefs of the Oakfuskies, Otassies, Cowetas, Casitas
[Cussetas], Chickas, Tallasses, Eanckeeches, and Mickasukies.” DOSTER, supra note 24, at 246. These
Indians represented towns of the Upper Creeks, Lower Creeks, and the Seminoles. Id. In support of
their request for indemnification, the partners of Panton, Leslie and Company stressed the “great
importance and services of the house as a political instrument of the government; that they had a right to
indemnity from the king; that the situation of the house was such, that they must sink under their losses
if it was not afforded; and that it must be sustained and preserved as indispensable to retain any control
over the Indians, and secure the possession of the provinces entrusted to their care.” Wilkins, supra note
16, at 172-73; Mitchel, 34 U.S. at 726-27.
27
COKER &WATSON, supra note 17, at 235, 250.
28
5 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: PUBLIC LANDS 331 (James Innerarity, Pensacola, to Governor
General Folch, Jan. 5, 1804). After describing the preliminary negotiations with the Indians, Innerarity
requested “permission to establish a talk upon this business with the Indians, and, upon a cession being
effected, that there may be confirmed and secured to the house the possession of the lands ceded . . . .”
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permission to proceed with the cession, subject only to the condition that
“the lands which the petitioner shall obtain from the Indians shall not be
disposed of without the knowledge and consent of this government.”29
The deed of cession, signed by twenty-four Lower Creek and Seminole
chiefs on May 25, 1804, stated that:
[W]e, the undersigned chiefs of the Seminole tribe assembled together,
having maturely weighed the enormous debts which we owe to the
house of Panton, Leslie & Co., . . . [] and being likewise responsible
for the robberies and depredations which, on two occasions, we have
perpetrated on the stores of the aforesaid house . . . we have
determined . . . to sell and to cede . . . a district of land which we hold
as actual owners and proprietors[].30
The transaction was confirmed on June 22, 1804, by Governor Folch at
Pensacola.31 The Upper Creeks objected, however, and consequently a
second deed (with a few modifications) was signed by chiefs from the
Upper Creeks, Lower Creeks, and Seminoles on August 22, 1804, at
Prospect Bluff (Chackeoheithlee) on the Apalachicola River.32 The cession
consisted of approximately one million acres.33 The Indian grantors
confirmed the August 1804 cession four months later, in front of Governor
Folch at Pensacola.34 The Upper Creeks, however, renewed their
opposition to the cession in 1806, necessitating the execution of a third deed
at the Spanish fort at St. Marks.35 Governor Folch confirmed the
transaction on December 3, 1806, once again with the condition that the
lands not be sold without the approval of the Spanish government.36
The acquisition of lands by Panton, Leslie and Company in 1804-1806
was almost immediately followed by an application from its successor, John
Forbes and Company, for permission to negotiate a similar cession as
Id. Yahulla Emathly, one of the Seminole chiefs, had met in 1803 with John Forbes at Pensacola, where
they reached a general agreement on a tract of land to be ceded to the company. After other chiefs were
informed of these negotiations, James Innerarity petitioned Governor Folch to permit the cession and to
confirm it upon completion. COKER & WATSON, supra note 17, at 247.
29 5 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: PUBLIC LANDS (decree by Governor Folch, dated Jan. 7, 1804);
see also Mitchel, 34 U.S. at 727.
30 5 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: PUBLIC LANDS 332 (deed of cession dated May 25, 1804). The
transaction took place at Cheskatalafa, an Indian village located on the west side of the Chattahoochee
River in present-day Henry County, Alabama. Boyd, supra note 23, at 62.
31 5 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: PUBLIC LANDS 332 (1860).
32 Id. at 332-33; DOSTER, supra note 24, at 249-51, 256-57.
33 COKER & WATSON, supra note 17, at 251-54.
34 5 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: PUBLIC LANDS 333 (decree by Governor Folch, dated Dec. 5,
1804); see also DOSTER, supra note 24, at 257; COKER & WATSON, supra note 17, at 254.
35 5 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: PUBLIC LANDS 333-34 (deed of cession, dated Aug. 2, 1806, at
St. Marks of Apalachie).
36 Id. at 334 (decree of confirmation by Governor Folch, dated Dec. 3, 1806).

WATSON_PUBLISHER (DO NOT DELETE)

2014]

Buying West Florida from the Indians

10/18/2014 2:35 PM

367

compensation for additional debts owed by the Creek and Seminole
Indians.37 The second series of transactions started in April of 1810 with a
deed transferring tracts of land that were contiguous to the prior grant. In
addition to the cession of land in favor of John Forbes and Company, the
Lower Creek and Seminole ceded to John Forbes personally an island in the
Apalachicola River as compensation for services rendered since 1785.38
Governor Folch gave his approval on June 15, 1810, with the same
condition that the lands could not be sold or otherwise transferred without
the approval of the Spanish government. Seven months later, on January
22, 1811, the principal chiefs of the Creeks and Seminoles confirmed the
1810 cession with another deed signed at Pensacola in the presence of
Folch.39 On April 22, 1811, and May 25, 1811, additional deeds were
signed confirming the grants to both John Forbes and Company and to John
Forbes in his individual capacity.40 On June 15, 1811, the cessions were
again ratified by Governor Folch.41
The entire “Forbes Purchase” totaled approximately 1.4 million acres
located between the Apalachicola and Wakulla rivers.42 According to one
source, the lands “comprised all of the present counties of Franklin and
Liberty, as well as a large part of [the counties of] Gadsden, Leon and
Wakulla.”43 In October of 1817 John Forbes obtained permission to sell
most of the company lands acquired from the Indians to Colin Mitchel, a
Havana merchant who claimed American, English, and Spanish

37 See Mitchel v. United States, 34 U.S. 711, 727 (1835) (“Another application was made to the
same governor in 1807, for his permission to make an additional purchase from the same Indians.”);
John C. Upchurch, Aspects of the Development and Exploration of the Forbes Purchase, 48 FLA. HIST.
Q. 117, 119 (1969) (“To the newly reorganized firm went all the rights and privileges of the former
company, as well as all property.”).
38 5 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: PUBLIC LANDS 333-34 (description of deed of cession, agreed to
at Cuskataloofa, on the Chatahoochie River, in April 1810); see also COKER & WATSON, supra note 17,
at 268; DOSTER, supra note 24, at 260-61 (describing the cession of lands on Apr. 19, 1810).
39 5 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: PUBLIC LANDS 335; see also DOSTER, supra note 24, at 262;
COKER & WATSON, supra note 17, at 269-70; see also id. at 253 (map of the “Forbes I” grant [the 18041806 and 1810-1811 Indian cessions] and the “Forbes II” grant [a tract of land given by Spain for losses
incurred during the War of 1812; not at issue in Mitchel v. United States]).
40 4 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: PUBLIC LANDS 165-66 (summarizing the Apr. 22, 1811, and May
25, 1811, deeds).
41 DOSTER, supra note 24, at 262.
42 COKER & WATSON, supra note 17, at 328.
43 Boyd, supra note 23, at 63. Another source describes the Forbes Purchase as an area one-third
larger than the State of Rhode Island consisting of lands in Gulf and Calhoun counties, as well as
Franklin, Liberty, Gadsden, Leon, and Wakulla counties. A.J. Hanna, Diplomatic Missions of the
United States to Cuba to Secure the Spanish Archives of Florida, in HISPANIC AMERICAN ESSAYS 21718 (1942); see also WILLIAM WARREN ROGERS, OUTPOSTS ON THE GULF: SAINT GEORGE ISLAND AND
APALACHICOLA FROM EARLY EXPLORATION TO WORLD WAR II 46 (1986) (map describing Forbes
Purchase as including the southwestern part of Leon County, the southern portion of Gadsden County,
all of Franklin County and Wakulla County, and all but the northern tip of Liberty County).
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citizenship.44
It was by no means clear, however, that Mitchel would be able to
profit from his land speculation. The geopolitical landscape had undergone
a dramatic transformation since the Forbes Purchase was completed. The
attack on Fort Mims by the “Red Sticks” from the Upper Creek towns in
August of 1813 was followed by a crushing defeat at the hands of Andrew
Jackson at Horseshoe Bend in March of 1814.45 Spanish influence also
weakened during the first two decades of the nineteenth century, leading to
the cession of Florida in the 1821 Adams-Onis Treaty. The Forbes
claimants were no doubt alarmed when Adams proposed the annulment of
all grants of land in Florida made after August 11, 1802, but the two
countries eventually agreed to a different date in Article 8 of the Treaty:
All the grants of land made before the 24th of January 1818 by His
Catholic Majesty or by his lawful authorities in the said Territories
ceded by His Majesty to the United States shall be ratified and
confirmed to the persons in possession of the lands, to the same extent
that the same grants would be valid if the territories had remained
under the dominion of His Catholic Majesty.46
Over the next fourteen years, Colin Mitchel and his associates would argue
that the Forbes Purchase was a valid grant, that must be upheld by the
United States, pursuant to Article 8 of the Adams-Onis Treaty. The validity
of the purchase was first questioned by a board of land commissioners, and
then rejected by a territorial court in Florida. Ultimately, however, the
Forbes Purchase was upheld by the United States Supreme Court in Mitchel

44
5 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: PUBLIC LANDS 335-36 (petition of John Forbes, dated Oct. 9,
1817, to the governor of Cuba, Jose Cienfuegos; decree of Governor Cienfuegos, dated Oct. 13, 1817,
permitting “the alienation of the lands solicited by John Forbes & Co.”). Prior to granting approval,
Cienfuegos sought the opinion of the Assessor General, who concluded that “there is no obstacle to your
excellency’s making use of the powers intrusted to you, and permitting the alienations proposed . . . .”
Id. at 336. Forbes did not sell the island that had been conveyed to him in his individual capacity. Colin
Mitchel acted on behalf of Carnochan and Mitchel, a Georgia-based trading firm, and purchased the
lands in 1819 for himself, his brothers, Robert, Peter, and Octavius, John Richard, and William
Carnochan. Upchurch, supra note 37, at 122; see also Hanna, supra note 43, at 219 (Mitchel “could
claim British protection by virtue of his birth in Scotland, was entitled to the privileges of a citizen of the
United States by naturalization, [and] his residence of twenty-five years in Cuba and marriage to a
Spanish woman, together with letters patent, constituted him a subject of Spain . . . .”).
45
MANLEY, BROWN & RISE, supra note 17, at 5. Fort Mims was located north of Mobile,
Alabama. The Battle of Horseshoe Bend took place in present day Tallapoosa County in east-central
Alabama.
46
Boggs, Florida Land Titles and British, Not Just Spanish, Origins, supra note 12, at 10
(emphasis added); see also WHITE, supra note 21, at 701; COKER & WATSON, supra note 17, at 327.
The United States insisted on Article 8 because large portions of Florida had been granted by the King
of Spain to his friends prior to the proclamation of the Treaty. The compromise date, January 24, 1818,
invalidated the Alagaon, Punonrostro, and Vagas grants, the three largest royal land grants. MARTIN,
supra note 17, at 6.
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v. United States.
EFFORTS TO OBTAIN CONFIRMATION OF THE FORBES PURCHASE
The validity of the Spanish land grants was a pressing concern in
Florida, and Congress quickly responded with legislation authorizing the
creation of a Board of Commissioners for both East Florida and West
Florida.47 With respect to claims in excess of one thousand acres, the land
commissioners were directed to “report the testimony, with their opinions,
to the Secretary of the Treasury, to be laid before Congress for their
determination.”48 On November 12, 1824, the Board of Commissioners for
West Florida submitted its report to Treasury Secretary William
Crawford.49 With respect to the Forbes Purchase, the commissioners
focused their inquiry on two issues: whether the Indians were “competent to
make a conveyance to lands, to be held and possessed ‘in full right and
entire property;’” and whether Governor Folch was “vested with the power
to make a grant, or confirm one of this description.”50 With respect to the
first issue, the commissioners reached the following conclusion:
[T]he Indians could make no conveyance vesting fee simple. Were the
contrary admitted, the confirmation of Governor Folch would have
been superfluous. . . . [T]he Indians collectively have no fee simple
right to lands within the Floridas . . . [but] seem to have enjoyed only a
usufructuary right, in which they were protected as long as they
continued in possession of the land.51
Although the language employed is consistent with the reasoning of Chief
Justice John Marshall in Johnson v. McIntosh, the commissioners did not
mention the Supreme Court decision, which had been handed down on
February 28, 1823.52
47 An Act for Ascertaining Claims and Titles to Land Within the Territories of Florida, ch. 129, 3
Stat. 709 (1822).
48 Id. at 718.
49 4 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: PUBLIC LANDS 156 (Feb. 22, 1825).
50 Id. at 169.
51 Id. With regard to the power of Governor Folch to make such a grant, the commissioners
stated that “we are not apprised of any law or ordinance by which it was warranted.” Id. The
commissioners also reported on the grant to John Forbes in his individual capacity, referring Congress to
the reasoning set forth in their opinion on the validity of the cession to John Forbes and Company. Id. at
204-05. John Forbes had died on May 13, 1823. COKER & WATSON, supra note 17, at 329. Octavius
Mitchel, who presented the Forbes Purchase claim to the board of commissioners on behalf of Colin
Mitchel and the other proprietors, was a member of the Florida territorial legislative council in 1823.
MARTIN, supra note 17, at 36.
52
See Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. 543, 591 (1823) (“[T]he Indian inhabitants are to be
considered merely as occupants, to be protected, indeed, while in peace, in the possession of their lands,
but to be deemed incapable of transferring the absolute title to others.”). The reasoning of the
commissioners is also consistent with statements made by Marshall in Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. 87, 142-
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Congress did not act on the commissioners’ recommendation
regarding the Forbes Purchase.53 Meanwhile, to further bolster his claim,
Colin Mitchel asked the Governor of Cuba, Francisco Dionisio Vives, to
permit Vincente Folch to explain his position regarding “the right of
property of the Indians to the lands in Florida” and the power of the Spanish
authorities “to approve and confirm their properties.”54 In September of
1827, Folch reaffirmed the validity of the Forbes Purchase:
[N]o question or doubt was ever raised . . . as to the right and power of
the Indians to pay their debts with that part of land which belonged to
them in absolute property . . . . [T]he Government has always
acknowledged the right of property and sovereignty of the Indians to
their lands, with right to alienate, cede, and give, without having, at
any time, been understood as confined only to the use . . . .55
Four months later, on January 3, 1828, the Senate received a memorial from
Robert Mitchel “and others” seeking approval of the Forbes Purchase.56
The memorialists argued that the right of the Indians to sell the lands was
based on “their aboriginal tenure of possession, and by the confirmation of
that tenure by the formal acts of the Spanish and British governments, who
alternatively claimed dominion over them.”57
Congress took no action on the memorial, but instead enacted
legislation on May 23, 1828, authorizing Florida land claims in excess of
3,500 acres to be adjudicated in the territorial courts, with the right of
appeal to the Supreme Court.58 Consequently, on October 18, 1828, a
petition to confirm the Forbes Purchase was filed in Tallahassee with the
Superior Court for the Middle District of Florida.59 The petition, to which

43 (1810) (observing that “a state can be seised in fee of lands, subject to the Indian title,” and noting
that “the nature of the Indian title, which is certainly to be respected by all courts, until it be legitimately
extinguished, is not such as to be absolutely repugnant to seisin in fee on the part of the state . . . .”).
53 The reports of the two Florida land boards were submitted to the House of Representatives in
February of 1825. 4 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: PUBLIC LANDS 155-56 (Feb. 22, 1825). Congress, by
legislation enacted on April 22, 1826 and February 7, 1827, did take action on most of the other Spanish
land grants addressed by the commissioners. Hanna, supra note 43, at 213.
54 COLIN MITCHELL, RECORD IN THE CASE OF COLIN MITCHELL AND OTHERS, VERSUS THE
UNITED STATES: SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, JANUARY TERM, 1831, at 230 (1831) (letter,
dated Aug. 19, 1827, from Colin Mitchel to Governor Vives) [hereinafter “1831 RECORD”], available at
http://books.google.com/books?output=text&id=xWdGAAAAYAAJ&dq=record+colin+mitchell&jtp=2
30. Folch was also asked to comment on his jurisdiction over the lands at issue. Id.
55 Id. at 231-35 (letter, dated Sept. 22, 1827, from Folch to Vives).
56 5 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: PUBLIC LANDS 329 (memorial, dated Dec. 31, 1827).
57 Id. at 330; see also id. at 331 (“[T]he parties were competent, and the government
consummated it with a ‘complete ultimate’ title.”).
58 Act of May 23, 1828, ch. 70, 4 Stat. 284, 284-86 (1828).
59 The petition was filed by:
Colin Mitchell, Robert Mitchell, in his own right, and as assignee of the estate and effects of the
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was appended numerous exhibits, asserts “[t]hat the Indians had the right to
convey the said lands, for that they were the original possessors, and
possession was guarantied to them by the treaty of 1784, and other
treaties.”60
The petitioners had attempted to engage Florida’s first delegate to
Congress, Richard Keith Call, but he requested a fee that was deemed
exorbitant.61 The claimants instead obtained the services of the current
delegate, Joseph M. White, despite the fact that he was one of the land
commissioners who in 1824 had recommended against confirmation of the
Forbes Purchase.62 During his tenure as land commissioner, White had
exposed a scheme by Call and other prominent individuals to defraud the
government.63 The two men became bitter rivals, and Call challenged
White to a duel during the election of 1825 (in which White defeated Call’s
candidate).64
In addition to White, the petitioners employed John Berrien, David
Bayard Ogden, and Daniel Webster. Berrien was the current Senator for the
state of Georgia and Ogden was an eminent New York attorney who often
appeared before the Supreme Court.65 The celebrated Webster—who
previously represented the claimants in Johnson v. McIntosh—had recently
mercantile house heretofore trading under the firm of Carnochan and Mitchell, and as trustee for
the creditors of said firm, and also of Richard Carnochan, William Calder, Benjamin Marshall,
Benjamin W. Rogers, John P. Williamson, the heirs and legal representatives of John McNish,
deceased, and James Innerarity.
1831 RECORD, supra note 54, at 3.
60
1831 RECORD, supra note 54, at 13. In Article 13 of the 1784 treaty, Spain promised the
Indians “the security and guarantee of those [lands] which they hold, according to the right of property
with which they possessed them, on condition that they are comprehended within the lines and limits of
his Catholic Majesty.” 5 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: PUBLIC LANDS 336 (extract from the treaty of Jun.
1, 1784, made at Pensacola, between Spain and the Talpuche and Seminole Indians).
61
HERBERT J. DOHERTY, JR., RICHARD KEITH CALL: SOUTHERN UNIONIST 69 (1961). Call
served as territorial delegate from 1823 to 1825.
62
4 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: PUBLIC LANDS 169 (Feb. 22, 1825). White’s actions were not
unprecedented: Robert Goodloe Harper argued that Indian title was a “mere privilege” in Fletcher v.
Peck, 10 U.S. 87, 123 (1810), but contended in Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. 543, 562 (1823), that the
Piankeshaw Indians were the owners of the lands in dispute and had the power to convey a complete
title to private individuals.
63
MARTIN, supra note 17, at 73; ERNEST F. DIBBLE, JOSEPH MILLS WHITE: ANTI-JACKSONIAN
FLORIDIAN 22-23 (2003).
64
EDWARD E. BAPTIST, CREATING AN OLD SOUTH: MIDDLE FLORIDA’S PLANTATION FRONTIER
BEFORE THE CIVIL WAR 88-89 (2002); Jackson Wilder Maynard, Jr., “According to Their Capacities
and Talents”: Frontier Attorneys in Tallahassee During the Territorial Period (Mar. 30, 2004)
(unpublished M.A. thesis, Florida State University), available at http://diginole.lib.fsu.edu/etd/2639.
65
See ROBERT TAYLOR SWAINE, THE CRAVATH FIRM AND ITS PREDECESSORS, 1819-1947, at
27 (1946). In January of 1828, Berrien unsuccessfully sponsored a bill in the Senate that would have
made it easier to prove Florida land claims based on Spanish grants. Royce Coggins McCrary, Jr., John
MacPherson Berrien of Georgia (1781-1856): A Political Biography (1971) (unpublished Ph.D. thesis,
University of Georgia).
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moved from the House of Representatives to the United States Senate. The
petition in the Florida Superior Court was filed by White and Berrien, who
appear to have been the primary advocates for the Mitchel claimants.
The appointment of counsel for the United States was complicated by
the transition to the Jackson administration on March 4, 1829. During the
final months of the Adams presidency, Attorney General William Wirt
stressed the need to employ capable counsel to litigate the complex and
immense Spanish land grants. Wirt recommended Joseph White, only to
learn that he had been retained by the Mitchel and Arredondo claimants.66
Adams nevertheless employed White to defend the United States in certain
cases, including claims founded on British grants.67
When Jackson became President, he selected John Berrien to be
Attorney General. Berrien, however, was allowed to continue to represent
the claimants in the Mitchel and Arredondo cases, despite Richard Call’s
protestations to Jackson that such engagements were “incompatible with his
duties as attorney-general of the United States.”68 William Wirt was
engaged to replace Berrien in the Mitchel and Arredondo cases, and Call
was selected by Jackson to serve (as “assistant counsel”) with James
Ringgold, the District Attorney of Middle Florida, and Richard C. Allen,
the territorial “law agent.”69
The judge for the Superior Court of the Middle District of the Territory
of Florida was Thomas Randall, who had moved to Florida shortly after
marrying the daughter of William Wirt.70 Randall was from Maryland,
where he had studied law under Thomas Johnson, the shareholder in the
Illinois and Wabash Land Company, who gave his name to the Johnson v.
McIntosh litigation.71 President James Monroe sent Randall to Cuba in
1824 in an unsuccessful attempt to retrieve documents relating to the

66 MANLEY, BROWN & RISE, supra note 17, at 50. The Arredondo claim involved 289,645 acres
in northeastern Florida. United States v. Arredondo, 31 U.S. 691, 691 (1832).
67 DOHERTY, supra note 61, at 58 (“So it was that . . . the assistant counsel for the United States
was appearing against the United States in the two cases involving the largest Florida land grants . . . .”);
McCrary, supra note 65, at 171 (“Berrien’s role in the Florida cases . . . seem[s] a bit peculiar, even for
his times.”).
68 DOHERTY, supra note 61, at 55 (letter, dated Mar. 28, 1829, from Call to Jackson); see also
McCrary, supra note 65, at 153-55 (describing Berrien’s arrangement with Jackson). McCrary notes
that Berrien was kept informed of the federal government’s litigation strategy in the Florida cases,
“which must have made it easier for [him] to represent the opposing side.” Id. at 170, n.88.
69 See 1831 RECORD, supra note 54, at 644-45; DOHERTY, supra note 61, at 57, 72; Maynard,
supra note 64, at 40, 78. The Act of May 23, 1828, authorizing the superior court to adjudicate large
Spanish land grants, also authorized the appointment of an “assistant counsel” and a “law agent” to
defend the interests of the United States. Act of May 23, 1828, ch. 71, 4 Stat. 286. Despite his title, Call
took a lead role in the litigation, appearing in both the Superior Court and Supreme Court.
70 MANLEY, BROWN & RISE, supra note 17, at 42-43.
71 Id. at 54.
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Spanish land grants in Florida.72 In 1827, Wirt purchased a plantation near
Tallahassee and arranged for his son-in-law to be appointed by President
Adams as the local territorial judge.73 According to one source, Judge
Randall soon thereafter “was identified with [Richard] Call’s political
associates and aspirations . . . .”74
To recap, during the Mitchel litigation the claimants suing the United
States were represented by a former federal land commissioner (White),
who was currently employed by the United States in other land grant
disputes, and the United States Attorney General (Berrien), who otherwise
supervised litigation for the federal government. The attorneys for the
United States included Richard Call, the Tallahassee Land Office Receiver
who had previously challenged White to a duel,75 and William Wirt, the
father-in-law of Judge Thomas Randall.76 In addition to being married to
the daughter of one of the lawyers representing the United States, Judge
Randall was a friend of Call and had previously traveled to Cuba—on
behalf of the government—to retrieve documents relevant to the validity of

72 Hanna, supra note 43, at 211. President Monroe had previously designated Randall in 1823 as
a special minister of the United States in order to travel to Puerto Rico and the West Indies and
investigate piracy in the area. MANLEY, BROWN & RISE, supra note 17, at 54.
73 DOHERTY, supra note 61, at 85; MANLEY, BROWN & RISE, supra note 17, at 54-55. Randall
was reappointed by President Jackson in 1831 and in 1836. Hanna, supra note 43, at 212 n.12.
74 MANLEY, BROWN & RISE, supra note 17, at 56.
75 A close friend of Andrew Jackson, Call served as territorial delegate from 1823 to 1824, and
then secured for himself the lucrative position of Receiver of Public Monies in the General Land Office
in Tallahassee. DOHERTY, supra note 61, at 40. If the Forbes Purchase had been invalidated, Call
would have personally profited for two reasons: as Land Office Receiver he earned commissions from
the sale of federal lands, and as a speculator he would have been able to purchase lands within the
Forbes Purchase at the government price of $1.25 per acre. Id. at 69. Call became one of the most
wealthy and powerful men in middle Florida, and served two terms (1836-1839 and 1841-1844) as
Florida’s territorial governor. See Maynard, supra note 64, at 15, 35, 38, 61; BAPTIST, supra note 64, at
91 (Call used his position at the Land Office “to divert land and profits to a clique of allies and
relatives”). He was, however, less successful as an advocate before the Supreme Court: he lost all
fifteen cases he argued. DOHERTY, supra note 61, at 69.
76 William Wirt’s position on Indian land rights is difficult to pin down. In 1819 he declared in a
letter that Indians “have no more right to sell the standing timber . . . than they have to sell the soil
itself.” Robert W. McCluggage, The Senate and Indian Land Titles, 1800–1825, 1 W. HIST. Q. 415, 471
(1970). As Attorney General, he stated that “[t]he conquerors have never claimed more than the
exclusive right of purchase from the Indians . . . . They do not hold under the States, nor under the
United States; their title is original, sovereign, and exclusive.” 1 OFFICIAL OPINIONS OF THE
ATTORNEYS GENERAL 466–67 (Apr. 26, 1821). As counsel for the Cherokee Nation, he prepared the
complaint filed in the Supreme Court which asserted the principle that “the first European discoverer has
the prior and exclusive right to purchase these lands from the Indian proprietors . . . [is] a principle to
which the Indian proprietors have never given their assent, and which they deny to be a principle of the
natural law of nations, or as in any manner obligatory on them.” RICHARD PETERS, THE CASE OF THE
CHEROKEE NATION AGAINST THE STATE OF GEORGIA 4 (1831) (complaint filed by the Cherokee Nation
in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1 (1831)); see also WATSON, supra note 2, at 323-24 (Wirt’s
complaint, filed on behalf of the Cherokee Nation, “denied that Indian nations are no longer free to sell
their lands to whomsoever they please”).
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the Forbes Purchase!77
The government, in its answer to the petition, asserted that:
[T]he Indians had a mere possessory interest in the lands they
occupied, a mere privilege of hunting, raising stock, &c., and that they
never have been considered as the absolute ‘fee simple’ proprietors of
the soil, with the power of selling and disposing of the ultimate
dominion and property, since the occupation and settlement of their
country by European nations.78
Although the answer does not mention either Johnson v. McIntosh or the
doctrine of discovery, the government did declare that its view of native
land rights conformed to “a principle of the law of nations, applicable to the
Indian tribes of Louisiana and Florida, and of North America generally.”79
Proceedings were held in abeyance in order for Richard Call to travel
to Cuba in another attempt to procure documents relating to the Forbes
claim and other land grants.80 During this time period Congress engaged in
a heated debate over the Indian Removal Act. Senator John McKinley, of
Alabama, asserted that “the case of Johnson and McIntosh” held that “the
natives had no title to the soil,”81 and Representative Wilson Lumpkin of
Georgia described as “a fundamental principle” the notion that “Indians had
no right either to the soil or sovereignty of the countries they
occupied . . . .”82 The Indian Removal Act, which was signed into law by
President Jackson on May 28, 1830, led directly to the infamous Trail of
Tears. By one estimate, one quarter to one half of the Cherokee, Creek, and
Seminole population died as a consequence of removal.83

77 Randall and Call (who went to Cuba in 1830 on a similar mission) believed the petitioners in
Mitchel, as well as other claimants relying on Spanish land grants in Florida, were fraudulently altering
documents to bolster their cases. See generally Hanna, supra note 43.
78 1831 RECORD, supra note 54, at 653-54 (answer of the United States, dated Jun. 20, 1829).
79 Id. at 654.
80 See Hanna, supra note 43, at 209-14; DOHERTY, supra note 61, at 59 (“[D]espite the refusal of
the authorities in Cuba to deliver the records, the claimants of Florida lands continued to produce
originals or authenticated copies of documents purporting to establish their claims. This caused many
persons, Call among them, to believe that Spanish officials were in collusion with the holders of
questionable land claims in Florida.”).
81 The Indians, VI Reg. Deb. 45, 353 (1830) (Apr. 17, 1830) (speech by Senator Peleg Sprague of
Maine, describing prior remarks by Senator John McKinley of Alabama).
82 Removal of Indians, 1830 GALE & SEATON’S REG. at 1024 (May 17, 1830). On the other
hand, Senator Theodore Frelinghuysen of New Jersey claimed that “we have distinctly recognized their
title; treated them as owners, and in all our acquisitions of territory, applied ourselves to these ancient
proprietors, by purchase and cession alone, to obtain the right of soil.” The Indians, 1830 GALE &
SEATON’S REG. at 312 (Apr. 9, 1830); see also WATSON, supra note 2, at 319-22.
83 Russell Thornton, Cherokee Losses During the Trail of Tears: A New Perspective and a New
Estimate, 31 ETHNOHISTORY 289, 289 (1984). The Choctaw and Chickasaw, who traveled shorter
distances, also suffered terrible losses. Id.
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THE DECISIONS IN THE MITCHEL LITIGATION
The hearing in Mitchel v. United States commenced in Tallahassee in
July of 1830.84 On November 2, 1830, Judge Thomas Randall dismissed
the petition, holding the deeds to be null and void “because the Indians had
not, by virtue of any title recognised to belong to them by Spain, such an
interest or estate in the lands as enabled them to sell and convey it away to
these petitioners in full property . . . .” 85 In support of his conclusion,
Randall relied heavily on Johnson v. McIntosh:
In adjudicating, now, upon titles derived from Indian grants, the courts
of the United States are no longer left to grope their way in obscurity
and uncertainty over an unexplored field. The decision of the Supreme
Court in the case of Johnson and McIntosh . . . has so clearly settled
the principles applicable to the subject . . . as to leave but little
occasion for hesitation or doubt in future cases.86
After quoting extensively from the Johnson decision, Randall held that
Spain, Great Britain, and the United States all denied “any right on the part
of the Indians, by the proper vigor of their own original title of occupancy,
to convey away the ultimate dominion or property of the soil to any third
party.”87 He further held that the Spanish government, by treaty or
otherwise, never recognized any right of the Florida Indians to sell and
convey a complete title to their lands.88
An appeal bond was filed in November and the cause was docketed in
the Supreme Court on February 2, 1831.89 Arguments in the case did not
begin, however, until February 10, 1835.90 The primary reason for the
delay was the continued efforts of the United States to obtain documents
from the Spanish government in order to prove that Mitchel and other
claimants had bribed authorities to forge and alter records.91 During the

84 See 1831 RECORD, supra note 54, at 644. Prior to 1838, the territorial court “seems to have
held its session wherever a suitable room could be found; from time to time it ordered the payment of
rent for a courtroom to the City Council of Tallahassee, Jackson Masonic Lodge, and the trustees of
Leon Academy.” Maynard, supra note 64, at 36. Joseph White argued on behalf of the petitioners, and
Richard Call, James Ringgold, and Richard Allen represented the United States. Id. at 40; DIBBLE,
supra note 63, at 128.
85 1831 RECORD, supra note 54, at 645. The opinion takes up ninety pages of the record. Id. at
644-734.
86 Id. at 669-70.
87 See id. at 675.
88 Id. at 676. Randall acknowledged that Governor Folch stated otherwise in 1827, but held that
his position “has never been acknowledged by any European nation.” Id. at 695.
89 Id. at 734; see also DOHERTY, supra note 61, at 64.
90 12 JOHN MARSHALL, THE PAPERS OF JOHN MARSHALL 561 (Charles F. Hobson ed., 2006)
(indicating that Mitchel was argued on February 10-11, 23-28, and March 2-4, 1835).
91 See Hanna, supra note 43, at 220-21. Fraud was in fact exposed in connection with a large
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intervening time period, the Supreme Court decided four cases that were
relevant to Mitchel v. United States.
The first two cases concerned Indian rights. In 1831, in Cherokee
Nation v. Georgia, John Marshall held that the Indian tribes are “domestic
dependent nations” and hence not “foreign states” entitled to invoke the
original jurisdiction of the Court.92 Justice Baldwin, who had been
appointed in 1830 by President Jackson, declared that Indian tribes were
neither sovereign nations nor foreign states.93 With respect to native land
rights, Baldwin stated that Johnson v. McIntosh “is too explicit to be
misunderstood,” and clearly established that “from the time of discovery”
the Indians held occupancy rights only, and that “the ultimate absolute fee,
jurisdiction and sovereignty was in the government.”94 The following year
the Supreme Court decided Worcester v. Georgia, and held that a state
statute regulating activities within the limits of the Cherokee Nation was
unconstitutional.95 As previously noted,96 John Marshall retreated in
Worcester from his “discovery gave title” statement in Johnson,97 and stated
in dicta that discovery conferred only “the exclusive right of purchasing
such lands as the natives were willing to sell.”98 Justice Baldwin dissented
in Worcester, but did not deliver an opinion for publication.99
The other two cases relevant to Mitchel involved the validity of
Spanish land grants in Florida. In United States v. Arredondo, the Federal
Government challenged the genuineness of the document introduced as
evidence of the grant, which supposedly conveyed 289,645 acres in
northeastern Florida in 1817 to Fernando de la Maza Arredondo and his
son.100 Justice Baldwin authored an opinion in favor of the claimants which
grant of land, estimated at about 1,500,000 acres, which had been granted to John Forbes and Company
for services rendered to the Spanish government and losses sustained by the company. DOHERTY, supra
note 61, at 62. The date of this grant—which was not at issue in the Mitchel litigation—had obviously
been altered in an effort to avoid the annulment in the 1821 Treaty of all grants by Spain made after
January 24, 1818. Id.
92
Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 17 (1831).
93
Id. at 31-50; see WATSON, supra note 2, at 323-25.
94
Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 32-33.
95
31 U.S. 515, 561 (1832) (“The Cherokee nation . . . is a distinct community occupying its
own territory, with boundaries accurately described, in which the laws of Georgia can have no force.”).
96
See supra notes 8-9 and accompanying text.
97
Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. 543, 573 (1823).
98
Worcester, 31 U.S. at 545; see also id. at 544 (“[T]he nation making the discovery . . .
[obtained] the sole right of acquiring the soil . . . .”).
99
Id. at 596; see also Lyndsay G. Robertson, Justice Henry Baldwin’s “Lost Opinion” in
Worcester v. Georgia, 24 J. SUP. CT. HIST. 50, 54 (1999) (“Baldwin based his dissent on his conclusion
that the Court lacked jurisdiction, as the record had been returned by the Georgia court clerk, and not by
the court itself.”).
100
United States v. Arredondo, 31 U.S. 691, 716 (1832). The Arredondo claimants were
represented by Joseph White, John Berrien, and Daniel Webster. The United States was represented by
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rejected the fraud claim, relying in part on the principle that “a public grant
is to be taken as evidence that it issued by lawful authority . . . .”101 The
land grant at issue in United States v. Clarke was also upheld, with Chief
Justice John Marshall noting that “[a] grant made by a governor, if
authorized to grant lands in his province, is prima facie evidence that his
power is not exceeded.”102 According to historian Charles Warren, in these
two cases the Supreme Court:
[E]stablished the public land policy of the Government on the basis of
the most scrupulous respect for treaties, preferring to preserve the
honor, rather than the property of the government, and to run the risk
of confirming possibly fraudulent claims rather than to impair the
reputation of the Government with foreign nations.103
The outcome in Mitchel was no doubt influenced by the Court’s
respect for treaty rights and obligations as expressed in Arredondo and
Clarke. The petitioners’ main arguments before the Supreme Court in
Mitchel were that: (1) “[t]he Indian sales of 1804 and 1811, and the several
acts in confirmation thereof by the governor of West Florida, vest in the
grantees a full and complete title to the land in controversy;” and (2) these
actions “amount to an acquiescence on the part of the king of Spain and his
legitimate authorities; which, according to the laws and usages of that
kingdom, would vest a valid title in the grantees.”104 The United States, in

Richard Call, William Wirt, and Roger Taney, who had replaced Berrien as Attorney General in July of
1831.
101 Id. at 729. The United States also argued that the lands could not be granted by Spain because
they were Indian lands. The Court, however, accepted the determination of Spanish authorities that the
lands had been abandoned. See id. at 747 (“The title of the Indians to these lands is not a matter before
us; the grant is made subject to their rights if they return to resume them, and their abandonment has
been ascertained by a proceeding which the intendant in the grant calls a sentence pronounced by him in
his official character.”).
102 United States v. Clarke, 33 U.S. 436, 451 (1834). After his defeat in Arredondo, but before
his defeat in Clarke, Richard Call ran against Joseph White in the 1833 election for territorial delegate.
He lost.
103 1 CHARLES WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 782 (rev. ed. 1987).
104 Mitchel v. United States, 34 U.S. 711, 718 (1835) (emphasis added). In Mitchel, unlike prior
cases, we also have the benefit of a printed brief setting forth the petitioners’ arguments. See WHITE,
supra note 21. In their brief, the petitioners argue that (1) the Forbes Purchase was not subject to the
British Royal Proclamation of 1763; (2) the Royal Proclamation was deemed necessary because, without
it, Indians held the power to convey “a full and complete title” to their lands to private individuals; and
(3) therefore, the Creek and Seminole Indians had the power to transfer a complete title to the Forbes
grantees. Id. at 714-15. A similar negative inference argument, however, was rejected in Johnson v.
McIntosh, 21 U.S. 543, 604 (1823) (“The acts of the several colonial assemblies, prohibiting purchases
from the Indians, have also been relied on, as proving, that, independent of such prohibitions, Indian
deeds would be valid. But, we think . . . the fact that such acts have been generally passed, is strong
evidence of the general opinion, that such purchases are opposed by the soundest principles of wisdom
and national policy.”). According to his biographer, it was Joseph White who “carried the argument”
for the petitioners. DIBBLE, supra note 63, at 129.
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response, contended that the Indian deeds “did not, either in themselves, or
with the confirmation thereof by governor Folch, convey to the grantees
therein named, any legal right to the lands in question.”105 With regard to
the latter point, the government argued that, for various reasons, Governor
Folch had no power to ratify and confirm the Indian cessions.106
It did not bode well for the United States that Justice Henry Baldwin—
the author of Arredondo—wrote the opinion in Mitchel v. United States
instead of Chief Justice John Marshall, who had spoken for the Court in all
prior decisions involving Indian land rights, including Johnson v.
McIntosh.107 The issue in Mitchel, as framed by Baldwin, was whether the
claimants to the Forbes purchase had acquired—either by (1) the law of
nations, (2) the stipulations of any treaty, (3) the laws, usages, and customs
of Spain, or the province in which the land is situated, or (4) the acts of
Congress or proceedings under them—”a right which would have been
valid if the territory had remained under the dominion and in possession of
Spain.”108 Just as in the Arredondo and Clarke cases, the Supreme Court
accepted the genuineness of the deeds and documents,109 and presumed that
actions taken by Spanish authorities were authorized and lawful.110
Baldwin then examined “the nature and extent of the Indian title to
these lands.”111 In this part of his opinion, Baldwin notes that “the view
taken by this court of Indian rights in the case of Johnson v. M’Intosh . . .
has received universal assent,”112 and restates the Johnson conception of
native property rights as follows: “Indians were protected in the possession
of the lands they occupied, and were considered as owning them by a
perpetual right of possession in the tribe or nation inhabiting them, [but] . . .

105 Mitchel, 34 U.S. at 720 (emphasis added). The United States also argued that the facts of
Mitchel were distinguishable from the facts in Arredondo and Clarke: “The claim . . . does not profess to
be founded on any original substantive grant made by the king of Spain or his officers; but on cessions
made by Indian tribes, and on alleged ratifications and confirmations thereof, and acquiescence therein,
by the Spanish authorities.” Id. By the time of the oral argument, William Wirt had died and Benjamin
Butler had replaced Roger Taney as Attorney General.
106 Id. at 721-22.
107 Mitchel was handed down on the last day of the term, March 17, 1835, and was the last case
in John Marshall’s long and illustrious career. The seventy-nine year old jurist died on July 6, 1835.
LEONARD BAKER, JOHN MARSHALL: A LIFE IN LAW 766 (1974); JEAN EDWARD SMITH, JOHN
MARSHALL: DEFINER OF A NATION 522 (1996).
108 Mitchel, 34 U.S. at 734.
109 Id. at 730.
110 Id. at 735 (“[T]he eighth article [of the 1821 Adams-Onis Treaty] expressly recognizes the
existence of these lawful authorities in the ceded territories, designating the governor or intendent, as the
case might be, as invested with such authority, which is to be deemed competent till the contrary is made
to appear”); id. at 741 (“[W]e cannot feel authorized to declare that governor Folch usurped any powers
vested in the intendant, in any of his acts relating to these lands.”).
111 Id. at 745.
112 See id. at 746.
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the ultimate fee was in the crown and its grantees . . . .”113 With regard to
the right of private individuals to purchase lands, Baldwin was careful to
distinguish private purchases without government approval (such as the
transactions at issue in Johnson) and private purchases with government
sanction (such as the Forbes Purchase):
Individuals could not purchase Indian lands without permission or
license from the crown, colonial governors, or according to the rules
prescribed by colonial laws; but such purchases were valid with such
license, or in conformity with the local laws; and by this union of the
perpetual right of occupancy with the ultimate fee, which passed from
the crown by the license, the title of the purchaser became complete.114
Relying once more on Johnson v. McIntosh as binding authority,
Baldwin states that “all title held under . . . license of the crown to purchase
from the Indians have been held good, and such power has never been
denied . . . .”115 Because the Forbes Purchase was licensed and confirmed
by Spanish authorities; and because “the law presumes the existence in the
provinces of an officer authorized to . . . give license to purchase and to
confirm,”116 the Court was “unanimously of opinion, that the title of the
petitioner . . . is valid by the law of nations; the treaty between the United
States and Spain . . .; the laws and ordinances of Spain, under whose
government the title originated; the proceedings under said treaty, and the
acts of congress relating thereto.”117
OTHER SALES OF INDIAN LANDS TO PRIVATE INDIVIDUALS
What distinguishes Mitchel v. United States from Johnson v. McIntosh
is the fact that the Spanish government both approved and confirmed the
Forbes Purchase, whereas the British Government, the State of Virginia, the
Continental Congress, and the United States Congress refused to sanction
either the 1773 purchase from the Illinois Confederacy or the 1775 purchase
from the Piankeshaw Indians. Although there were a few instances of
unconfirmed private purchases of Indian lands in colonial America, such
113

Id. at 745.
Id. at 746 (emphasis added).
115
Id. at 747 (citing Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. 543, 595-604 (1823)).
116
Mitchel, 34 U.S. at 760; see also ERNEST SUTHERLAND BATES, THE STORY OF THE
SUPREME COURT 135 (1982) (The Mitchel Court “refused to go behind a formal grant to consider
evidence of fraud behind it.”); DOHERTY, supra note 61, at 67 (“The Indian grants were upheld as . . .
having been made according to Spanish law and practice, and the copies of the confirmation documents
were accepted despite Call’s protestations.”).
117
Mitchel, 34 U.S. at 761. In addition to upholding the validity of the Forbes Purchase, the
Court also confirmed the title to the island in the Apalachicola River granted to John Forbes in his
personal capacity, even though the claim was pending before the Superior Court in Florida. Id.; see also
DOHERTY, supra note 61, at 68.
114
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transactions were rare and considered aberrations.118 In BUYING AMERICA
119
I examine, in detail, the unsuccessful efforts of the
FROM THE INDIANS,
Illinois and Wabash Land Companies, and other land speculators to
convince government officials that Indian tribes own the lands they occupy,
and can convey a valid and complete title to private individuals. For
purposes of this article, it suffices to briefly discuss the most prominent
examples of purchases of Indian lands without government approval or
confirmation.
The Puritan Roger Williams was banished from the Massachusetts Bay
Colony because of his belief that Europeans could “justly occupy lands in
the Americas only by purchasing those lands from their rightful owners, the
Indians.”120 In 1638, Williams obtained the right to settle in present-day
Rhode Island by virtue of a deed from the local Indians.121 Williams,
however, deemed it necessary to go to England to obtain a charter for
“Providence Plantations,” which was either an independent grant of royal
land or, at minimum, a confirmation by the Crown of his prior purchase.122
In 1667 Puritans from Connecticut relocated and founded Newark,
New Jersey, by purchasing a 20,000-acre tract in exchange for goods in
kind, including “four barrells of beere.”123 Eight years later, a panel of
prominent English lawyers rendered their legal opinion that the private
purchase of Indian land was invalid because “the Prince[, . . .] who make
the Discovery[,] hath the Right of the Soyle & Govermt of that place.”124
The opponents of the Newark purchase went so far as to assert that claiming
title to land “by an Indian Deed only” was tantamount to “High Treason”
insofar as it suggested “the Indian Grantor to be the Superior Lord of that
Land . . . .”125 A lawsuit was filed in the eighteenth century, but the case

118 See WATSON, supra note 2, at 22. John Marshall, in Johnson v. McIntosh, acknowledges
“that many tracts are now held in the United States under the Indian title, the validity of which is not
questioned,” but characterizes such transactions as aberrations, and notes that “there is no case, so far as
we are informed, of a judicial decision in their favour.” 21 U.S. 543, 600-01 (1823).
119 See WATSON, supra note 2.
120 WILLIAM CHRISTIE MACLEOD, THE AMERICAN INDIAN FRONTIER 199 (1928).
121 WATSON, supra note 2, at 14.
122 Id.; see also Johnson, 21 U.S. at 603 (determining that the royal charter for Rhode Island “can
amount to no acknowledgment, that the Indian grant could convey a title paramount to that of the crown,
or could, in itself, constitute a complete title. On the contrary, the charter of the crown was considered as
indispensable to its completion”).
123 JOHN T. CUNNINGHAM, NEWARK 24 (1966).
124 13 DOCUMENTS RELATIVE TO THE COLONIAL HISTORY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK 486-87
(E.B. O’Callaghan ed., 1881).
125 6 ARCHIVES OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY, 1ST SERIES, DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE
COLONIAL, REVOLUTIONARY AND POST-REVOLUTIONARY HISTORY OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY 31922 (William A. Whitehead et. al. eds., 1738-1747).
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was never concluded and the Indian deed was never upheld.126
George Croghan, a trader who was once described as the “foremost
living expert on the western Indian country,”127 purchased from the Iroquois
Indians several large tracts of land in western Pennsylvania. The Iroquois
sold Croghan two hundred thousand acres in 1749, four thousand acres in
1754, one and a half million acres in 1773, and six million acres in 1775.128
Although Croghan did not obtain prior authorization for his purchases, he
did acknowledge the Crown’s authority, and consequently sought royal
confirmation until about 1770, when he began to contend that the private
purchases from the Indians transferred full title.129 In 1764 British officials
refused to ratify Croghan’s private purchases of Iroquois land.130 In the
early 1770s, when Croghan attempted to sell part of his 1749 grant to
George Washington, the future president offered to buy fifteen thousand
acres “when a legal title was established.”131 A committee of the
Continental Congress in 1781 recommended confirmation of Croghan’s
acquisitions, but based on the disputed rationale that the purchases had been
effected with “consent and approbation” of government officials.132 The
purchases were never upheld.
In 1767, the Sioux Indians purportedly granted to explorer Jonathan
Carver a large tract of land in present-day Minnesota and Wisconsin.133
Carver and his heirs initially sought royal ratification of the purchase, but
later argued that government approval was not necessary. The Senate
Committee on Public Lands concluded on January 23, 1823, that Carver’s
alleged Indian deed “could not vest the legal title in him.”134 The matter
was finally resolved in 1825, when the House Committee on Private Land
Claims declared that the invalidity of private purchases was “settled beyond
controversy” in “the case of Johnson against McIntosh.”135
The private purchase in colonial America that most closely resembles
the Forbes Purchase is the “Indiana grant” negotiated between the
“suffering traders” and the Iroquois Indians in connection with the 1768
Treaty of Fort Stanwix. In 1754, and again in 1763, Pennsylvania
126

See, e.g., WATSON, supra note 2, at 25.
NICHOLAS B. WAINWRIGHT, GEORGE CROGHAN: WILDERNESS DIPLOMAT 306 (1959).
128
WATSON, supra note 2, at 47, 53, 62.
129
Id. at 47.
130
Id.
131
ALBERT T. VOLWILER, GEORGE CROGHAN AND THE WESTWARD MOVEMENT, 1741-1782, at
292 (1926).
132
WATSON, supra note 2, at 145-46.
133
See id. at 59.
134
3 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: PUBLIC LANDS 534.
135
4 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: PUBLIC LANDS 84 (1825); see also WATSON, supra note 2, at
275-76.
127
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merchants suffered losses due to Indian warfare, and George Croghan was
appointed by the “suffering traders” to travel to England to obtain
restitution in the form of a large tract of land.136 When British officials
declined to grant land as compensation for the traders’ losses, a decision
was made to obtain restitution directly from the Iroquois. The merchants
and their creditors formed the Indiana Company and distributed gifts in
anticipation of the treaty conference at Fort Stanwix in the fall of 1768.
Pursuant to a carefully orchestrated plan, the Iroquois first deeded to the
Indiana Company an immense tract of land in what is now West Virginia
and eastern Kentucky. The Indians and their grantees then attempted to
include the terms of the transaction in the treaty with Great Britain, hoping
to increase the likelihood of royal sanction.137 British officials, however,
refused to ratify the Indiana grant, which led to further political
maneuvering and a new proposal—by the “Grand Ohio Company”—for
approval of a colony that would include and uphold the Indiana grant. In
May of 1773, the British Board of Trade signed off on the plan of
government for the “Vandalia” colony, but the unfolding events heralding
the American Revolution ensured that the project would never proceed.138
The Indiana Company shareholders then obtained opinions from respected
English and American legal authorities regarding the validity of their
grant.139 The Indiana grant, however, was never confirmed.140
On March 17, 1775, Richard Henderson and the Transylvania

136

WATSON, supra note 2, at 48-53.
Id. at 56-58.
138 Id. at 58-61.
139 In March of 1775, Henry Dagge of Lincoln’s Inn in London offered his opinion that the
recipients of the 1768 grant “hath a good, lawful and sufficient title,” and a month later, Serjeant-at-Law
John Glynn declared that the Iroquois “had a power of alienating and transferring in any manner, or to
any persons, unless they had been restrained by their own laws.” See SAMUEL WHARTON, VIEW OF THE
TITLE TO INDIANA, A TRACT OF COUNTRY ON THE RIVER OHIO 22-24 (1775). Patrick Henry and
Benjamin Franklin, during the Second Continental Congress, informed the Indiana Company that they
concurred with the views of Dagge and Glynn. 11 LAWRENCE HENRY GIPSON, THE BRITISH EMPIRE
BEFORE THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION: THE TRIUMPHANT EMPIRE, THE RUMBLING OF THE COMING
STORM 1766-1770, at 483 n.105 (1965). In his printed brief in Mitchel v. United States, Joseph White
refers to the opinions of Dagge, Glynn, Henry, and Franklin. WHITE, supra note 21, at 716-18. Judge
Randall and Justice Baldwin make no mention of the opinions, which were also unsuccessfully invoked
by the Johnson claimants. See WATSON, supra note 2, at 253.
140 In 1779, the State of Virginia declared the Indiana grant to be null and void and refused to
compensate the shareholders. WATSON, supra note 2, at 104-05. As with the case of George Croghan,
see supra note 132 and accompanying text, a committee of the Continental Congress in 1781
recommended confirmation of the Indiana grant based on the assumption that the purchase had been
approved by Great Britain. No action was taken, however, forcing the Indiana Company to file suit
against Virginia in 1792 in federal court. The plaintiffs in Grayson v. Virginia claimed that the 1768
Iroquois grant was valid even without government confirmation. The suit, which was renamed
Hollingsworth v. Virginia, was dismissed in 1798 after the passage of the Eleventh Amendment. See id.
at 190.
137
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Company purchased from the Cherokee Nation a vast region between the
Cumberland and Kentucky Rivers. The Company shareholders asserted
that the Cherokees had an absolute right to sell their land, but
acknowledged that the lands were located within the charter boundaries of
Virginia.141 Not content with mere jurisdiction, the Virginia General
Assembly in June of 1776 declared the purchase to be null and void and
then included a clause in the state constitution that “no purchases of lands
shall be made of the Indian natives, but on behalf of the public, by authority
of the General Assembly.”142 On November 4, 1778, the Virginia House of
Delegates again declared the purchase to be invalid, but resolved that it is
“just and reasonable” to compensate the shareholders “for their trouble and
expense.”143
In 1795 and 1796, John Askin, Sr., a British subject living in Detroit,
and his associates entered into several purchase agreements with the
Ottawa, Chippewa, and Potawatomi Indians for large portions of presentday Michigan and northern Ohio.144 In order to profit from their
investments, Askin advised his son, John Askin, Jr., to meet with the
Indians assembled at the Fort Greenville treaty conference and persuade
them to insist that the treaty confirm their right to dispose of their lands “as
they think fit without any restraint Whatsoever.”145 The junior Askin,
however, was not allowed to participate in the treaty negotiations, and
Article V of the Treaty of Greenville instead reaffirmed the government’s
preemptive right to control the disposition of Indian lands.146
141 The 1775 deed stated that the Indian grantors held their title “in fee simple” and were
authorized to convey the territory. WATSON, supra note 2, at 88, 103.
142 Id. at 103-04; VII FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER
ORGANIC LAWS OF THE STATES, TERRITORIES, AND COLONIES NOW OR HERETOFORE FORMING THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 3819 (Francis N. Thorpe ed., 1909).
143 GEORGE W. RANCK, BOONESBOROUGH 253 (1971); WATSON, supra note 2, at 143. The land
granted by Virginia is the present site of Henderson, Kentucky.
144 The lands purchased included a large tract along the Maumee River, including present-day
Toledo, Ohio, another tract along the southern shore of Lake Erie, and a third tract comprising most of
Michigan’s lower peninsula. WATSON, supra note 2, at 88, 179.
145 4 CORRESPONDENCE OF LIEUTENANT-GOVERNOR JOHN GRAVES SIMCOE 35 (E. A.
Cruikshank ed., 1926) [hereinafter Cruikshank] (letter, dated Jul. 5, 1795, from John Askin, Sr., to John
Askin, Jr.).
146 WATSON, supra note 2, at 179-80. In his report to the Secretary of the Army, General “Mad”
Anthony Wayne noted that “influential Characters” had counseled the Indians “to insist upon the
[a]bsolute & inherent right of disposing of all their Lands either by sale deed or gift, how [w]hen & to
whomsoever they please, & to make this right the first Article of the treaty.” ANTHONY WAYNE: A
NAME IN ARMS, SOLDIER, DIPLOMAT, DEFENDER OF EXPANSION WESTWARD OF A NATION: THE
WAYNE-KNOX-PICKERING-MCHENRY CORRESPONDENCE 461 (Richard C. Knopf ed., 1960). When the
terms of the Greenville Treaty were announced, the British commandant at Detroit remarked that Askin
and other land speculators “have been severely disappointed by the Treaty, and their purchases of course
set aside.” Cruikshank, supra note 145, at 92 (letter, dated Sept. 8, 1795, from Colonel Richard England
to Lieutenant-Governor John Graves Simcoe).
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Private purchases of Indian lands were exceedingly rare in the
nineteenth century, and claims to Indian lands based on transactions in the
prior century were invariably denied. In 1805, the House Committee on
Public Lands of Representatives declared that a 1779 grant by the
Piankeshaw Indians to George Rogers Clark lacked government approval
and was void.147 Likewise, in 1819, the Senate Committee on the Public
Lands reported against a claim by Loyalist Alexander Macomb to land
granted by the Potawatomi Nation.148 It is not surprising, therefore, that the
transactions at issue in Johnson v. McIntosh were rejected by the Board of
Land Commissioners at Vincennes (Indiana) in 1806, and again by the
Board of Land Commissioners at Kaskaskia (Illinois) in 1810.149 The 1773
and 1775 purchases were made without prior permission of the British
Government and thus contravened the 1763 Royal Proclamation. The
grantees sought Crown approval, but instead provoked General Major
General Frederick Haldimand to issue his own proclamation reiterating that
all purchases of Indian lands without royal approval “will be considered as
void and fraudulent.”150 Virginia consistently opposed the efforts of
speculators to establish marketable title to lands purchased from Indian
tribes, and the Continental Congress, the United States Congress, and
ultimately the United States Supreme Court refused to confirm the
purchases.151

147
1 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: PUBLIC LANDS 229 (report, dated Dec. 23, 1805, on Clark’s
petition). The claim was denied. 15 ANNALS OF CONG. 301 (1805). The land at issue was located
across the Ohio River from present-day Louisville, Kentucky. Virginia in 1784 did award 150,000 acres
to Clark and his men in acknowledgement of services rendered during the American Revolution.
WATSON, supra note 2, at 108-09.
148
3 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: PUBLIC LANDS 360 (report, dated Jan. 15, 1819) (“It is . . .
believed the United States have, in no instance, recognised an Indian grant, whether made under the
British or American Government, as valid to give title, such grants being prohibited by the laws and
regulations of both.”). The Committee reported favorably on a claim to an island that was based on
adverse possession. Id.
149 WATSON, supra note 2, at 232-33.
150 8 THE PAPERS OF SIR WILLIAM JOHNSON 1074-76 (Alexander C. Flick ed., 1933)
(proclamation, dated Mar. 10, 1774, of General Frederick Haldimand).
151 Whereas the 1781 committee of the Continental Congress recommended upholding the
purchases by George Croghan and the Indiana Company, the same committee recommended that the
1773 and 1775 purchases from the Illinois and Piankeshaw Indians be declared invalid. Among the
reasons given for its decision, the committee noted that latter purchases “had been without license of the
then government or other public authority . . . .” 22 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 230
(1782); see also WATSON, supra note 2, at 144-47. The Illinois and Wabash Land Companies submitted
numerous memorials to Congress seeking confirmation of the grants. The 1810 memorial contained
most of the legal arguments that would later be presented to the Supreme Court in Johnson v. McIntosh.
Id. at 243-49. The House Committee on Public Lands resolved that the petition “ought not be granted”
because the transactions were prohibited by the “plain and express” requirement of government approval
in the 1763 Royal Proclamation. 2 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: PUBLIC LANDS 219-20 (report, dated Jan.
30, 1811).
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DOES MITCHEL REJECT THE JOHNSON DISCOVERY DOCTRINE?
I have argued elsewhere that the rights of ownership, possession, and
disposition in native lands can be aggregated or diffused, leading to four
different conceptions of indigenous land rights:
(1) The indigenous inhabitants own the lands they occupy and also
hold the right of possession. In addition, the indigenous inhabitants
are free to sell or transfer their property rights to whomsoever they
please. Preexisting indigenous property rights were unaffected by
European “discovery.”
(2) The indigenous inhabitants continue to own the lands they occupy
but, after discovery, cannot sell their lands to whomsoever they please.
The discoverer holds a “right of preemption,” giving the discoverer the
exclusive right to acquire the property rights of the indigenous
inhabitants.
(3) The indigenous inhabitants continue to possess the lands they
occupy but, after discovery, no longer own the lands they occupy. The
discoverer owns the land subject to the native title, i.e., the right of
possession (or occupancy).
The discoverer/owner can transfer
ownership notwithstanding the native title. The discoverer/owner has
the exclusive (preemptive) right to extinguish the native title. Once
the native title is extinguished, the discoverer/owner of the lands also
has the right of possession.
(4) The indigenous inhabitants have no property rights. The discoverer
owns the land and holds the possessory rights. The indigenous
inhabitants are trespassers (or perhaps “tenants at will”). When the
discoverer/owner makes payments to the indigenous inhabitants, it
does so to expedite their removal, not to acquire property rights.152
I have also previously contended that the Johnson conception of native
land rights falls within the third category, whereas John Marshall’s revised
view of native land rights in Worcester falls within the second category.153
In this article, I assert that Justice Baldwin and the Supreme Court endorsed
and applied the Johnson discovery rule in Mitchel v. United States.
Other scholars have reached the same conclusion. Felix Cohen noted
in 1947 that, while Mitchel differs from Johnson insofar as the Forbes
152 Blake A. Watson, The Doctrine of Discovery and the Elusive Definition of Indian Title, 15
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 995, 998-99 (2011) [hereinafter Watson, Discovery Doctrine]; WATSON, supra
note 2, at 274, 357. The view that the indigenous inhabitants have no property rights was the position
adopted by Great Britain with respect to the Australian Aborigines.
153 See generally Watson, Discovery Doctrine, supra note 152. While I wholeheartedly support
the repudiation of the doctrine of discovery, I believe that the differences between the Johnson and
Worcester conceptions of Indian title—which both place limits on native disposition rights—can be
overstated. Id. at 1024 n.145.
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Purchase was “made with the consent of the sovereign,” the Mitchel Court
nonetheless endorsed the Johnson view that Indian title was a “right of
possession” and that “the ultimate fee was in the crown and its grantees.”154
In his book Common Law Aboriginal Title, Kent McNeil likewise states
that the Johnson discovery rule “was again restated” in Mitchel when
Justice Baldwin held that Indians held a “right of possession” but not the
“ultimate fee,” which “was in the crown and its grantees.”155 Lindsay
Robertson contends that, whereas Marshall changed his views on Indian
title in Worcester, Baldwin restored Johnson formulation of the discovery
doctrine in Mitchel,156 and Matthew Fletcher agrees that “Worcester’s
rejection of the Johnson rule . . . was itself rejected in the 1835 Term in
Mitchel v. United States.”157
John Hurley was the first to argue that the Mitchel decision endorses
Marshall’s dicta in Worcester.158 But the leading proponent of this position
is David Wilkins, who has written extensively in the field of federal Indian
law.159 In his 1994 article on Mitchel v. United States, Wilkins argues that
Mitchel is “a stunning ruling” and “an implicit repudiation of the doctrine
of discovery” because it “fundamentally contradicts the doctrines
enunciated in M’Intosh,” by holding that “tribes may alienate their
aboriginal territory to whomever they wish . . . .”160 Eight years later,
Wilkins, and co-author Tsianina Lomawaima, in their book, UNEVEN
GROUND: AMERICAN INDIAN SOVEREIGNTY AND FEDERAL LAW, assert that
Mitchel “denied the McIntosh precedent . . . by disavowing that the doctrine
154

Felix S. Cohen, Original Indian Title, 32 MINN. L. REV. 28, 50 (1947).
KENT MCNEIL, COMMON LAW ABORIGINAL TITLE 253-54 (1989).
156 LINDSAY G. ROBERTSON, CONQUEST BY LAW: HOW THE DISCOVERY OF AMERICA
DISPOSSESSED INDIGENOUS PEOPLES OF THEIR LANDS 138-39 (2005).
157 Matthew L.M. Fletcher, The Iron Cold of the Marshall Trilogy, 82 N.D. L. REV. 627, 647
(2006).
158 John Hurley, Aboriginal Rights, the Constitution and the Marshall Court, 17 REVUE
JURIDIQUE THÉMIS 403, 440 (1982-83) (Baldwin’s views of Indian title “confirmed and developed those
advanced by Johnson in Fletcher v. Peck and by Marshall in Worcester v. Georgia”). For the views of
Justice William Johnson, see Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. 87, 145-48 (1810); WATSON, supra note 2, at
241-43.
159 See, e.g., DAVID E. WILKINS, AMERICAN INDIAN SOVEREIGNTY AND THE U.S. SUPREME
COURT: THE MASKING OF JUSTICE (1997); VINE DELORIA, JR. & DAVID E. WILKINS, TRIBES, TREATIES,
AND CONSTITUTIONAL TRIBULATIONS (1999); DAVID E. WILKINS & TSIANINA LOMAWAIMA, UNEVEN
GROUND: AMERICAN INDIAN SOVEREIGNTY AND FEDERAL LAW (2002); VINE DELORIA, JR. & DAVID E.
WILKINS, THE LEGAL UNIVERSE: OBSERVATIONS ON THE FOUNDATIONS OF AMERICAN LAW (2011);
DAVID E. WILKINS & HEIDI KIIWETINEPINESIIK STARK, AMERICAN INDIAN POLITICS AND THE
AMERICAN POLITICAL SYSTEM (3d ed. 2011); DAVID E. WILKINS, THE NAVAJO POLITICAL EXPERIENCE
(4th ed. 2013); DAVID E. WILKINS, HOLLOW JUSTICE: A HISTORY OF INDIGENOUS CLAIMS IN THE
UNITED STATES (2013).
160 Wilkins, supra note 16, at 175 (“stunning ruling”); supra note 16, at 176 (“implicit
repudiation”); supra note 16, at 159-60 (“fundamentally contradicts”); supra note 16, at 160 (“tribes
may alienate”).
155
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of discovery vested absolute ownership of America in the discovering
states.”161
I respectfully disagree with the position taken by Hurley, Lomawaima,
and Wilkins regarding the meaning of Mitchel v. United States. It is
difficult to accept the view that Mitchel “denied the McIntosh precedent”
when Justice Henry Baldwin expressly stated in Mitchel that “the view
taken by this Court in the case of Johnson v. M’Intosh . . . has received
universal assent.”162 In particular, I believe that two statements in
Baldwin’s lengthy (and dense) opinion have created confusion.163
The first statement is Baldwin’s observation that the native right of
occupancy “is considered as sacred as the fee simple of the whites.”164
Wilkins and other scholars appear to contend that Justice Baldwin equated
aboriginal title with the English common law fee simple absolute.165
However, in support of his “as sacred as the fee simple” statement, Baldwin
cited Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, where John Marshall held that the Indian
right of occupancy to their lands is “as sacred as the fee-simple, absolute
title of the whites,” but then explained that “they are only rights of
occupancy, incapable of alienation, or being held by any other than
common right without permission from the government.”166 Marshall, in
turn, cited to his 1823 Johnson opinion, where he had observed that “[t]he
absolute ultimate title has been considered as acquired by discovery, subject
only to the Indian title of occupancy, which title the discoverers possessed
the exclusive right of acquiring.”167 Rather than chart a new path in
Mitchel, Baldwin was restating the Johnson discovery rule: that Indian title
is not a right of ownership (since discovery divested Indians of ownership
of their lands) but rather is a right of occupancy (possession) that is “as
sacred as the fee-simple.” The Supreme Court in Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v.
United States (1955) made it clear that Indian title is not the equivalent of

161

WILKINS & LOMAWAIMA, supra note 159, at 60.
Mitchel v. United States, 34 U.S. 711, 746 (1835).
163 Baldwin exhibited odd behavior at times, missed the entire 1833 term, and was considered by
some to be mentally deranged. See Robertson, supra note 99, at 52-53; G. EDWARD WHITE, THE
MARSHALL COURT AND CULTURAL CHANGE, 1815-35, at 301 (1988) (noting Baldwin’s “incoherence as
a jurist.”).
164 See Mitchel, 34 U.S. at 746.
165 See Wilkins, supra note 16, at 159-60 (asserting that Mitchel “fundamentally contradicts the
doctrines enunciated in M’Intosh” and establishes that “tribes are the possessors of a sacrosanct title that
is ‘as sacred as the fee-simple.’”); Frank Shockey, “Invidious” American Indian Tribal Sovereignty:
Morton v. Mancari Contra Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, Rice v. Cayetano, and Other Recent
Cases, 25 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 275, 279 (2001) (asserting that the “as sacred as fee simple” definition in
Mitchel conflicts with the characterization of aboriginal title in Fletcher v. Peck and Johnson v.
McIntosh).
166 Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 48 (1831) (emphasis added).
167 Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. 543, 592 (1823).
162
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fee simple title when it held that Indian title is not “property” for purposes
of the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment.168
The second passage in Mitchel v. United States that has caused
confusion is Baldwin’s statement that, “[t]he Indian right to the lands as
property was not merely of possession, that of alienation was
concomitant . . . .”169 This statement is the basis for Wilkins’ assertion that
a “critical review of Mitchel” reveals that “tribes may alienate their
aboriginal territory to whomever they wish . . . .”170 Baldwin, however, was
not stating that Indians can sell their lands to whomever they choose but
rather that Indians may dispose of the right of occupancy if they have
government approval to do so. The sentence in its entirety reads as follows:
The Indian right to the lands as property, was not merely of
possession, that of alienation was concomitant; both were equally
secured, protected, and guarantied by Great Britain and Spain, subject
only to ratification and confirmation by the license, charter, or deed
from the governor representing the king.171
John Marshall, in Johnson v. McIntosh, acknowledged that the Indian
right of occupancy could be transferred to private individuals if done so
with government sanction:
[T]he usual mode adopted by the Indians for granting lands to
individuals, has been to reserve them in a treaty, or to grant them
under the sanction of the commissioners with whom the treaty was
negotiated. The practice, in such case, to grant to the crown, for the
use of the individual, is some evidence of a general understanding, that
the validity even of such a grant depended on its receiving the royal
sanction.172
Although this statement does not precisely fit the facts of the Forbes

168
348 U.S. 272, 279 (1955) (“Indian occupation of land without government recognition of
ownership creates no rights against taking or extinction by the United States protected by the Fifth
Amendment or any other principle of law.”); see also United States v. Cook, 86 U.S. 591, 593 (1874)
(“[T]he right of the Indians to their occupancy is as sacred as that of the United States to the fee, but it is
only a right of occupancy.”); Watson, Discovery Doctrine, supra note 152, at 1021-24.
169 Mitchel v. United States, 34 U.S. 711, 758 (1835).
170 Wilkins, supra note 16, at 160; see also id. at 181 (“[T]he aborigines’ right to dispose of the
same to whomever they chose, [is] a right recognized in Mitchel but denied in M’Intosh . . . .”); WILKINS
& LOMAWAIMA, supra note 159, at 61 (“In a statement directly at odds with the McIntosh holding that
Indians lack the power to convey their lands, the Mitchel court held that ‘the Indian right to the lands as
property was not merely of possession, that of alienation was concomitant; both were equally secured,
protected, and guarantied by Great Britain and Spain.’”).
171 Mitchel, 34 U.S. at 758-59 (emphasis added).
172 Johnson, 21 U.S. at 598 (emphasis added); see also id. at 604 (rejecting “the general
proposition, that a title acquired from the Indians would be valid . . . without the confirmation of the
crown”).
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Purchase (which was licensed and approved by Spanish authorities, but not
made part of treaty negotiations), it is clear that Mitchel does not reject
Johnson’s central thesis that European “discovery” of America divested
native Indians of the “power to dispose of the soil at their own will, to
whomsoever they pleased.”173 Baldwin makes clear, at several points in his
opinion, that Indians can transfer their right of occupancy to private
individuals, but only with government approval:
Individuals could not purchase Indian lands without permission or
license from the crown, colonial governors, or according to the rules
prescribed by colonial laws; but such purchases were valid with such
license, or in conformity with the local laws; and by this union of the
perpetual right of occupancy with the ultimate fee, which passed from
the crown by the license, the title of the purchaser became
complete . . . [their rights of occupancy were respected,] until they
abandoned them, made a cession to the government, or an authorized
sale to individuals.174
As previously discussed, the Spanish government both approved and
confirmed the Forbes Purchase, and the Supreme Court in Mitchel
acknowledged the validity of the actions taken by Governor Folch and other
Spanish officials. Rather than embrace Marshall’s views of the discovery
doctrine set forth in Worcester, the Court in Mitchel endorsed and applied
the Johnson discovery rule, by holding that discovery divested Indians of
ownership, but did not divest them of rights of occupancy.175 Mitchel also
follows Johnson by rejecting the view that Indian tribes possess unqualified
disposition rights, holding instead that sales to private individuals require
government sanction.176
CONCLUSION
The Forbes Purchase and Mitchel v. United States are important parts

173

Id. at 574.
Mitchel, 34 U.S. at 746 (emphasis added); see also id. at 750 (“Whether the grants were made
to the king directly . . . or directly to the parties by a grant to them, must be a matter purely in the
discretion of the king, or the officer whom he had authorised to accept or confirm the cessions by his
license.”) (emphasis added).
175 See Jill Norgren, Protection of What Rights They Have: Original Principles of Federal Indian
Law, 64 N.D. L. REV. 73, 112 (1988) (“[T]he specific nature of the dispute in Mitchel permitted Justice
Baldwin to clarify what had been conceded only in dictum in Johnson v. McIntosh, namely, that Indian
title included the power to transfer as well as to occupy . . . . At the same time, however, the Court
maintained its commitment to discovery theory and the dual, split nature of Indian land title.”).
176 See Nell Jessup Newton, At the Whim of the Sovereign: Aboriginal Title Reconsidered, 31
HASTINGS L.J. 1215, 1242 n.170 (1980) (“Mitchel made it clear that Indian tribes may alienate their
occupancy right, though the sovereign’s consent is necessary for the buyer to take a fee simple title.”).
174
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of Florida history.177 Johnson v. McIntosh, however, remains the leading
Supreme Court case on native land rights. Although I respectfully disagree
with the views of David Wilkins and Tsianina Lomawaima regarding the
significance of Mitchel v. United States, I fully agree with their broader
argument that the doctrine of discovery “is a clear legal fiction that needs to
be explicitly stricken from the federal government’s political and legal
vocabulary.”178
Whether viewed as divesting Indians of absolute
disposition rights (Worcester) or as divesting Indians of ownership and
absolute disposition rights (Johnson and Mitchel), the discovery doctrine is
inconsistent with contemporary norms of indigenous rights and should be
rejected.

177 Shortly after the Mitchel decision, the Apalachicola Land Company began promoting land
sales and—for a brief period of time—the only Gulf of Mexico locations with larger populations and
more commerce were New Orleans, Louisiana, and Mobile, Alabama. COKER & WATSON, supra note
17, at 355; MARTIN, supra note 17, at 171; ROGERS, supra note 43, at 6-27, 45-49. The boom period,
however, lasted for about four years. MARTIN, supra note 17, at 174; Upchurch, supra note 37, at 139.
In 1923, the Florida Supreme Court held that the Forbes Purchase did not include submerged lands
under navigable and tide waters of a bay of the Gulf of Mexico. Apalachicola Land & Dev. Co. v.
McRae, 98 So. 505 (Fla. 1923). Today, most of the Forbes Purchase is either within the boundaries of
the Apalachicola National Forest or is property owned by the St. Joe Paper Company. BROWN’S
BOUNDARY CONTROL AND LEGAL PRINCIPLES 186 (Walter G. Robillard & Donald A. Wilson eds., 6th
ed. 2009).
178 WILKINS & LOMAWAIMA, supra note 159, at 63; see also WATSON, supra note 2, at 355-58.

